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NOTES
RECONSIDERATION OF SHARE CERTIFICATE
NEGOTIABILITY
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act makes share certificates negotiable to

the extent that bona fide and value-giving certificate purchasers are insured of
title if all necessary indorsements are regular and to the extent that both good
faith and value are defined very broadly., The purpose of this note is to exxUniform Stock Transfer Act, §§ i, 4-8, 22. The act as drafted by Professor Williston was
approved by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in r9o9. The act applies only to stock in corporations organized within states that have adopted the act or a similar law, only to transfers within such states, and only to certificates issued after the adoption,
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, §§ 22-3; Hunt v. Drug, Inc., 35 Del. 332, 156 Atl. 384 (I93I).
Voting trust certificates and share certificate receipts are not subject to the act, for these instruments are evidence only of stock certificates and not of corporate shares, Union Trust Co.
of Rochester v. Oberg, 214 N.Y. 517, zo8 N.E. 8og (i9x5); Hearne v. Gillette, 5I1 La. 79, 91
So. 634 (1922); Comm'r of Banks v. Chase Securities Corp., io N.E. (2d) 472, 485 (Mass.,
1937).
The act also makes share certificates negotiable to the extent that bona fide and value-giving certificate purchasers are insured of freedom from corporate liens not stated on the instruments and freedom from claims of prior owners' creditors, Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
§§ 13-15. These topics will not be discussed in this note because they are collateral to the
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amine the negotiability provisions of the act, to analyze the asserted justifications for these rules, and to suggest changes that may be advisable under
modem practices in share certificate transactions.
I. NEGOTIABILITY OF SHARE CERTIFICATES UNDER T E

NIFORM

STOCK TRANSFER ACT

The act defines good faith as simply honesty in fact.2 If this means that the
recipient of a certificate must have a "clear conscience," then good faith refers
to a state of mind and the test of bona fideness is completely subjective. A
state of mind, however, can be demonstrated only through external manifestations, and the standard of good faith depends upon the types of words and
conduct which are considered as indicating dishonesty. Conceivably uncautious
or careless business conduct could be considered as evidence of bad faith, for
one who acts without due caution may be attempting to avoid actual notice
of a defect. Were customary commercial patterns of carefulness used as standards of measuring conduct, bona fides would mean "businesslike action" or
commercial honesty. The Transfer Act, however, apparently intended a liberal
test of good faith, for it provides that negligent conduct is not indicative of
dishonesty. Where there is no actual notice, bad faith can be demonstrated
only by proving knowledge that should put one on suspicion or by proving that
the instrument was obtained "out of the ordinary course of business."3 Since
main problem of negotiability. Neither does the note consider whether assignment of a certificate terminates any right the corporation may have to refuse recognition to shares represented
by the certificate, for the Transfer Act, except for the provision that a corporation is protected
in paying dividends to the registered owner, ignores the problem, Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
§ 3. More specifically, the act does not provide whether a corporation may assert the defense
of an infirmity arising when a certificate is issued against future purchasers of the instrument,
nor whether the defense of consent by a predecessor in title may be asserted to bar a shareholder's derivative suit. For a discussion of some of these problems, see a doctor's thesis by
William Starr, The Corporate Share Certificate and the Share: A Process of Merger ('935).
The act has been adopted by the following twenty-eight states: Alabama (1931), Arkansas
(1923), California (1931), Colorado (1927), Connecticut (1917), Georgia (1939), Idaho (1927),

Illinois (1917), Indiana (1923), Louisiana (igio), Maryland (igio), Massachusetts (igio),
Michigan (1913), Minnesota (1933), New Hampshire (1937), New Jersey (1g16), New York
(1913), Ohio (1g1), Oregon (1935), Pennsylvania (19ii), Rhode Island (1912), South Dakota
(1921), Tennessee (1925), Utah (1927), Virginia (1924), Washington (1939), West Virginia
(i93i), Wisconsin (1913).

2 Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 22.
3Concerning good faith in acquiring a share certificate, see De Boer v. Anthony, is N.E.
(2d) 26o (Mass. 1938); Edgerly v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 292 Mass. 81, 197 N.E. 518
(1935); Muffat v. Detroit-Macomb Land Co., 252 Mich. 692, 234 N.W. 148 (i93); Hazard v.
Powell,

230

Ohio App. 71, 154 N.E. 357 (1926); Crosby v. Simpson, 234 Mass. 568,

125

N.E.

616 (1920); i Meyer, The Law of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges 348 (i93i). An interesting case is presented when a broker sells a correctly indorsed certificate against which a
"stop transfer" order exists. If the broker furnishes his customer with other shares, the broker
is deemed a bona fide purchaser of the shares represented by the challenged certificate: stock
exchange rules may require the purchase of the replacement shares (see note 70 infra), and so
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departure from customary commercial standards of care is often the only dereliction that can be established, proof of bad faith in such cases is difficult under
the Transfer Act. To this extent the good faith provision of the act does not
materially limit the negotiability of share certificates.4
The Transfer Act adopts the Negotiable Instruments Law definition of value
as "an antecedent or pre-existing obligation" or "any consideration sufficient
to support a simple contract"; the Transfer Act, however, goes further and
expressly provides that security for an antecedent obligation constitutes value.S
This broad definition would seem to indicate that even one purchasing for a
"pepper-corn" is protected. An unusually low price, however, should be evidence of bad faith. The value and good faith requirements must, therefore,
be construed together, and since both value and good faith are defined so
6
broadly, these requirements cannot be said materially to restrict negotiability.
The Transfer Act provides that share title may be transferred only by delivery of the share certificate indorsed either in blank or specially by the
person appearing thereon as shareowner, or accompanied by a separate document of assignment similarly signed.7 Delivery "is effectual .... though made
it can be said the broker acquires the original shares in the ordinary course of business, United
States Gypsum Co. v. Faroll, 296 IlL. App. 47, 15 N.E. (2d) 888 (1938). The Illinois court relied on Gruntal v. Nat'l Surety Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (193o) (dealing with bonds),
which, says Steffen, "by sheerforce of assertion, gave the broker the immunities of a purchaser
in good faith, although obviously he was in no real sense a purchaser," Steffen, A Proposed
Uniform Act Making Investment Instruments Negotiable, 34 Col. L. Rev. 632, 653 (1934).
4 Cf. the good faith test in Gill v. Cubit, 3 Bar. & Cr. 466 (K.B. 1824) with that in Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870 (K.B. x836); see Relation between Bad Faith and Notice under
the N.I.L., 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 617 (1933). The Transfer Act does not expressly provide who
has the burden of proving good faith, but presumably under Section 18 the common law governs, and one purchasing after a theft must establish his good faith, Bank of the United States
v. Cooper-Bessemer Corp., 146 Misc. 20, 261 N.Y. Supp. 687 (1932).
s Negotiable Instruments Law, § 25; Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 22.
6See McAllister v. McAllister Coal Co., 12o N.J. Eq. 394, 184 Ati. 716 (1936); Adams v.
Silver Shield Min. & Mill. Co., 82 Utah 586, 21 P.(2d) 886 (1933) (holding that acquisition of
a share certificate through a property settlement contemporaneous with a divorce does not
make one a holder for value).
7 Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § i. This note will for convenience use the term "indorse" to
include signing a separate document assignment. The usual "separate document" is a power of
attorney to "sell, assign, or transfer," but no particular form is necessary, Holmes v. Holmes,
182 Wis. 163, 196 N.W. 248 (1923). For cases discussing indorsements, see Crosby v. Simpson,
234 Mass. 568, 125 N.E. 616 (1920); Moulin v. Ideal Savings & Homestead Ass'n, 178 So. 521
(La. App. 1938); Clark v. Western Feeding Co., io Cal. App. (2d) 727, 52 P. (2d) 991 (1936).
The title transfer requirements of the Transfer Act are usually held not to govern an attempted
share transfer unless a third party's rights intervene, In re Cornell's Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128
At. 503 (1925); In re Estates of Antkowski, 286 Ill. App. 184, 3 N.E. (2d) 132 (1936). But
see Parker v. Colonial Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, zi NJ. Eq. 49, 161 Ati. 353 (1932). Between immediate parties to a transfer, title passes at the time intended; since a third party's rights may
prevent this title transfer, it is often said "equitable title" passes when intended, while "legal
title" passes upon compliance with the act's transfer provisions, Stuart v. Sargent, 283 Mass.
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by one having no right of possession and having no authority from the owner
of the certificate or from the person purporting to transfer title." 8 In other
words, possession of a regularly indorsed instrument gives rise to a presumption
of ownership or power to pass title. Although the act does not specifically
state that a thief may transfer title by delivering a correctly indorsed certificate, nevertheless, the Uniform Commissioners intended that the act should
give "full negotiability to certificates of stock,"9 and it is now well settled
that even a thief may pass good title.!o But whenever the indorsement is
special, only a a delivery to the named indorsee is an effective delivery.A forged indorsement on a certificate cannot deprive a shareowner of his
rights; a genuine indorsement is thus a form required for negotiability. Even
if the owner indorses in blank, an erasure and subsequent duplication of the
signature results in protection being denied to one purchasing after the alteration; it is said the purchaser relies upon a forgery rather than upon the owner's
indorsement." There is nothing in the nature of things, however, which prevents legislating that delivery of a falsely indorsed or an unindorsed share
certificate passes good title. Share certificates would then be treated like bearer
536, x86 N.E. 649 (193); Reinhard v. S. B. Roby Co., iio Misc. 152, 179 N.Y. Supp. 781
(1920). The prior in time of two equitable titles prevails, Good Fellows Associates, Inc. v. Silverman, 183 Mass. 173, x86 N.E. 48 (1933); Suchy v. Frankenberg, 251 App. Div. 349, 296 N.Y.
Supp. 545 (1937).
8 Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 5; Ripley v. J. Murray Walker & Co., Inc., 286 Mass. 264,
19o N.E. 532 (1934); Connolly v. People's State Bank, 26o Mich. 352, 244 N.W. 500 (1932);

Patterson v. Fitzpatrick McElroy Co.,

247

Ill. App. 81

(1927).

9 The Commissioners' notes to Section 5 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
10Turnbull v. Longacre Bank, 249 N.Y. r59, 163 N.E. 135 (1928), noted in 38 Yale L. J. 390
Peckinpaugh v. H. W. Noble & Co., 238 Mich. 464, 213 N.W. 859 (1927). But see dissent in Jackson v. Peerless Portland Cement Co., 238 Mich. 476, 213 N.W. 863 (1927), maintaining that the Transfer Act does not apply to shares taken feloniously; see also 27 Mich. L.
Rev. 93 (1928). In explaining why a thief should be able to pass good title, it is said that a correctly indorsed certificate appears the same to a purchaser whether it has been stolen, lost, or
entrusted to a wrongdoer, Seymour, The Proposed Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 9 Cal. L. Rev.
i86, 194 (1921).
11See Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 21, providing that after a special indorsement, the
special indorsee appears by the certificate to be the shareowner, and his indorsement is necessary again to transfer share title. But cf. Parker v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 174, 137 N.E. 295
(1922), noted in 23 Col. L. Rev. 488 (I923), for the analogous situation in the case of a
promissory note.
(1929);

12Nat'l

Surety Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 237 App. Div. 485, 261 N.Y. Supp. 6o
The purchaser is not protected even if a special indorsee's name is erased, leaving
what appears to be a blank indorsement, Place v. Chaffee, 251 Mass. 5o8, 146 N.E. 722 (1925).
Where the erasure is skillful, the rule seems hard on purchasers, insofar as the Transfer Act
permits reliance on the owner's blank indorsement. An explanation of the result may be a desire to promote examination for erasures; a suggested preventative is to print certificates on
paper that exposes erasure.
(1933).
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bonds, and would in effect be more negotiable.3 Greater care would be required to safeguard stock ownership, but there is no reason to believe that stock
would become a less desirable form of investment.r4 Eliminating the indorsement requirement, however, is said to be impractical because stock certificates
are almost always registered and the registry is highly convenient for determining who can vote and receive dividends.s But turning share certificates
into bearer instruments would not impede maintaining the registry: instead of
substituting registrations upon receipt of correctly indorsed certificates, as is
the practice today, corporations could enter transfers upon receiving unindorsed
certificates. The only practical difference to corporations would be that theft
of share certificates might increase, and the corporations would become involved in more litigation concerning conflicting claims to stock shares. 6
II. EXPLORING THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NEGOTIABILITY CONFERRED UPON SHARE CERTIFICATES BY THE TRANSFER ACT

At the time the Transfer Act was drafted, and even today, the first argument
in support of share certificate negotiability is that "it is in accordance with
mercantile custom."7 This however is a loose manner of speaking, for negotiability is not a matter of business practice but a legal principle for deciding
conflicting claims of ownership. What the mercantile custom proposition probably means is that businessmen consider certificates to be readily transferable
and consider possession of a correctly indorsed instrument as giving the possessor a right or power to transfer the obligation represented. The custom argument rests upon the assumption that the standard commercial patterns of conduct do not require an honest person to look behind a correctly indorsed share
certificate; the law should not distort these accepted business patterns except
in the interests of society as a whole. It is to be doubted, however, whether
the assumption has any basis in fact. Cautious brokerage practices would
indicate that even stock brokers do not act as if they considered share certificates to be negotiable. Only a few of the Chicago brokers interviewed during
this study realized that certificates in corporations organized in states having
the Transfer Act are more negotiable than certificates in other corporations.
X3Share certificates would become more negotiable in the sense that one of the forms now
required for negotiability and for transfer-a correct indorsement-would be unnecessary, and
even unindorsed (or falsely indorsed) certificates would then be negotiable.
'4 But see Coats v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 17o La. 871, 875, 129 So. 513, 514 (1930)
stating that if a regular indorsement were not required to transfer title, stock would become
"less valuable as an article of commerce." The court, however, gives no reasons to support its
belief.
'5 See Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 3.
x6See pp. 51o-11 infra.
17 The

Commissioners' note to Section 5 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
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All of the brokers interviewed asserted that they did not treat the two types
x8
of certificates differently.
Whenever the "mercantile custom" argument is raised, it is usually supplemented by the contention that the "interested" commercial society desires
negotiability of share certificates.'9 But who are the members of this "interested" group? If everyone having dealings in share certificates desired negotiability, then obviously there would be no reason for deciding share controversies according to any other principle unless vague notions of public policy
intervened. 2 But we should regard with suspicion any statement that all
interested persons have expressed a desire that share certificates be made
negotiable. The large mass of stockowners are practically voiceless; in this
respect they resemble the great bulk of "consumers" in our economy. It is
much more probable, therefore, that the phrase "interested community" refers
only to those members of that community who are sufficiently organized to
express themselves. In this smaller group are the bankers and stockbrokers
and their insurers."1 The brokers buy and sell stock, sometimes acting as vendors
or purchasers, but usually as agents. The bankers and the brokers advance
money on stock collateral. Naturally it is to the advantage of both for the
law to say that if they honestly accept a regularly indorsed instrument, no
prior owner can claim the shares represented thereby." And of course it is to
0

s Of twenty-four brokers interviewed in the Chicago area, only five knew there was a legal

distinction as to negotiability between shares in corporations organized in states having the
Transfer Act and shares in corporations organized in other states, see note z supra. Two out of
the five had studied law.
x9It was decided by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws that "full
negotiability ought to be given to these instruments of commerce if the Conference were to
act in response to the business sentiment of the country .... " Proceedings of the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, ioi (i9ro).
2 An example may be taken from the development of the negotiability of bills and notes.
Early merchant court cases involved only merchant traders, who as a class desired negotiability,
Holdsworth, The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments, 31 L. Q. Rev. 12, 173,
376 (i915). Later in the common law courts, non-merchants were allowed to declare on the
custom of merchants by employing the fiction that one who used a commercial instrument
must be a merchant, see Claxton v. Swift, 2 Show. 494 (K. B. 1686). But when non-merchants
became concerned with these instruments, negotiability should not have been justified by saying "all the merchants desire it."
2 Even though brokers and bankers may not fully realize how they benefit from negotiability, nevertheless their lawyers are aware of the advantages. The lawyers often advise the
brokerage group as to what legislation should be favored, etc. We might well ask whether the
negotiability provided for in the Transfer Act was not a direct result of the climate of opinion
prevailing at the time the act was drafted, which could be characterized as one favorable to
finance capitalism.
22Conservative brokers sometimes say that they do not care what rule is adopted concerning negotiability, for the Transfer Act's lenient rule benefits only the careless and "shady
houses." These utterances, however, must not be taken too seriously, for in speaking "off the
record," the same brokers admit that every once in awhile someone "puts something over" on
them.
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the advantage of the insurance companies to be relieved from liability under
the same circumstances.23 But is it also to the advantage of that large interested class which may be termed "the investors"? 24 Certainly the inability of
investors to reclaim their stock when the indorsed representative certificates
are in the hands of bona fide purchasers, does not of itself work to the investors'
advantage. This is especially true insofar as stock certificates (to repeat the
stereotyped phrase) "may be examined only at long intervals,"'' and investors,
especially in rural areas, do not adequately safeguard their certificates and
are rather susceptible to being defrauded into intrusting their stock to swindlers . 6 The interests of brokers and bankers, therefore, must be weighed against
the interests of investors. Negotiability should be adopted only if it also benefits investors or the economic society as a whole.
To demonstrate that share certificate negotability is beneficial to investors,
it is argued that negotiability protects purchasers' expectations, that investors
must be purchasers at one time or another, that the investing and purchasing
classes roughly coincide, and that negotiability protects the entire purchasing
class at the expense of individuals in the class.27 It is contended, therefore, that
the individuals who are hurt by negotiability have no cause to complain: They
benefit by the rule in their capacity as purchasers, and as owners they could
have easily protected their share rights by refraining from indorsing, by not
having trusted a dishonest person, or by more adequately safeguarding their
instruments. In addition, it is said that purchasers (or pledgees), under any
other rule, would have the onerous burden of inquiring from the registered
owner whether the person in possession of the certificate has the right to
transfer title to the shares represented. This argument would perhaps justify
share certificate negotiability were it not for one thing: share certificates rarely
pass from hand to hand as does money, but in more than ninety-nine per cent
of all stock transfers, a broker is employed to buy or sell the shares. 28 Once
'sThe insurance companies often carry on the litigation arising out of their customers'
transactions.
24Many brokerage firms are "investors." But for purposes of simplicity this note assumes
that the "investor class" is limited to persons outside the brokerage system.
2SMacChesney, Uniform State Laws 55 (1916). Previously, MacChesney says: "While it
is true that in certain financial centers like New York City and possibly Chicago also, it is
probable that a considerable percentage of certificates of stock are used as collateral, in the aggregate, in my judgment, they form only a small proportion of the total stock investments
which are affected by such a provision..... " See also, Seymour, The Proposed Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, 9 Cal. L. Rev. 186, 187 (1921), citing MacChesney.
26 See, for example, Rand v. Hercules Powder Co., Inc., 129 Misc. 89i, 223 N.Y. Supp. 383

(1927).
'7 For a similar argument in the case of bonds, see Steffen, A Proposed Uniform Act Making Investment Instruments Negotiable, 34 Col. L. Rev. 632, 654 (r934).
2SNo adequate statistics are available to determine what proportion of share transfers are
outside the brokerage system, but transfer agents and brokers all agree that the percentage is
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the professional broker enters upon the scene, the picture changes. The purchaser can secure protection by requiring his broker to certify that all necessary
indorsements are regular and that the shares acquired are not subject to adverse
claims.29 With brokers making the actual purchases, the purchaser and investor classes no longer coincide.30 Furthermore, the broker as a purchaser is in a
position to inquire whether the registered owner has authorized the transfer.3'
And in addition, the broker is also in a position to insure against losses
32
which may be assessed against him for making an unauthorized transfer.
Under these conditions would it be right to justify share certificate negotiability
by arguments which ignore the brokerage system-the outstanding feature of
stock transfers?
One argument for negotiability of share certificates remains to be investigated. Corporate stock shares are a capital-raising device which operates
through shares being considered as investments. Corporate assets and earning
power underlie share value, but desirability as an investment rests also upon
custodial convenience and marketability. It is said that negotiability enhances
salability because purchasers will be more willing to buy if they are assured of
freedom from the claims of prior owners. Increased salability of share certificates means that stock shares would be more liquid and hence more desirable
investments. Obviously this result would benefit the investor class, and perhaps the entire free enterprise economy. 33 But the existence of a brokerage
system makes the argument fallacious. In general, neither one who purchases
through dr from a broker nor one who sells to or through a broker will be
extremely small. At the present time, approximately three million shares are transferred
through brokers daily, so that about thirty thousand shares would have to be transferred outside the system in order for these latter transfers to constitute one per cent of ll transfers.
29 Notes 88 and 89 and related texts, infra.
30 Although brokers usually purchase as agents for investors, nevertheless the agency relationship is peculiar, so that we reasonably can make a dichotomy between "brokers" on one
side and "investors" on the other. See note 89 and text, infra.
31 Notes 56 and 57 and related texts, infra.
32 Of the Chicago brokers interviewed, all the large firms and several small houses carried
insurance, note 6o infra.
33"The purpose of .... [the Uniform Stock Transfer Act] .... is to enable those dealing
with certificates of stock .... to rely upon them as reliable evidence of title. This facilitates
business by making the circulation and transfer of property as easy, safe, and certain as possible, and protecting purchasers and lenders acting in reliance upon these documents which are
the customary indicia of title. The security of a large amount of stock transfer, credit, and
banking business rests upon such evidence of title," Ballantine, Private Corporations 473
(1927). "An effective functioning of the markets for the trading of stock requires a fluid, unhampered transfer of shares of stock merely by delivery of the certificate," The Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, 32 Col. L. Rev. 894 (1932). See also Berle and Pederson, Liquid Claims and National Wealth (1934), advancing the theory that negotiability aids liquidity and so benefits the
economy.
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significantly affected by whether or not share certificates are negotiable.34
Transactions outside the brokerage system are so insignificant that it is folly
to contend that they materially affect the salability or liquidity of shares.
The negotiability conferred upon share certificates by the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act remains unjustified. The mere fact that negotiability is a simple
principle, perhaps a rule of thumb, does not adequately recommend its adoption for deciding cases; simplicity only too often results from blindly accepting
unexplored principles. The remainder of this note will attempt to explore
principles which should underlie rules for deciding conflicting claims to stock
ownership.
T.

CONSIDERATION OF PRINCIPLES TO SUPPLANT NEGOTIABILITY

Since the stock-brokerage system (including the banks) plays such an important role in stock transactions, any rules for determining controversies arising out of stock transfers must reflect the system's operation. But there are
still a few transfers completely outside brokerage circles, and principles that
work justice within the system may not do so in other controversies. Two sets
of principles may therefore be needed inasmuch as the two types of transactions are fundamentally different.
A.

TRANSACTIONS WITHIN THE STOCK-BROKERAGE SYSTEM

The stock-brokerage system consists of individuals, partnerships and corporations, labelled brokers, licensed by states to engage in the business of
buying and selling securities. In addition, banks that perform investment services for their customers and that advance money on stock collateral are an
integral part of the system. 35 Brokers usually buy or sell securities for others
on a commission basis, and when they act for themselves, disclosure of that
fact might be necessary.36 The brokers are located chiefly in the large financial
centers, especially in cities having stock exchanges ;37 the larger firms are usually
34 One who purchases from a broker need not be materially affected by negotiability, for he
can procure the broker's guarantee, see note 89 and text, infra. A registered owner who sells
through a broker will not be concerned with the negotiability of his certificate. Only where the
registered owner appoints a new agent to deal with the broker or where one other than the registered owner represents himself to the broker as shareowner does negotiability substantially
affect the transaction. The broker's caution may slow down the sale. P. 512 infra.
3sBrokers and bankers often cooperate in engineering stock transactions. Brokers consider
banks as part of the general stock-investment scheme, for banks not only loan money on stock
collateral, but often purchase securities for their customers, guarantee indorsements, and furnish information concerning strangers. Before the National Banking Act of 1935 many national banks conducted extensive brokerage businesses.
36See i Meyer, The Law of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges 249, 279 (,931).
37 The following American cities have stock exchanges: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Colorado Springs, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New
Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Richmond, St. Louis, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Seattle, Spokane, Washington, Wheeling. The Chicago Classified Telephone Directory
for Sept. 1939 lists 387 "Investment Securities" firms.
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members of the exchanges. Only members can sell on an exchange, but nonmembers often have agreements with members by which they trade on the exchange through the members. Securities not listed on an exchange are sold "over
the counter."38 All exchange and most over the counter sales consist of a purchase by one broker from another broker:39 the buyer's broker purchases from
the seller's broker, and the selling broker must always guarantee all indorsements to the buying broker.40
Towns, small cities, and rural areas usually are not directly served by the
brokerage system; the volume of trade does not warrant permanent brokerage
establishments, and "traveling salesmen" brokers are rare. 4r Large investors
in these areas often establish accounts with brokerage firms in larger cities.42
The remainder of the populace is only indirectly served by the brokerage system through the local banker, who often acts as an investor's agent in dealing
with city brokers.43 But on the whole, the great bulk of the populace in the
smaller communities shows little interest in stock as a form of investment.44
With this system as a base, how should a redrafted Transfer Act adjust
rights between a shareowner who has been wrongfully separated from his certificate, a broker who sells the certificate at the request of some third person
(who has since disappeared), other brokers who receive the certificate by way
of purchase or pledge, and a private investor who purchases the shares represented by the instrument? On the one hand, if justice permits, the rules of
law which form the answer to this question should neither require brokers to
adopt costly new practices nor unduly slow up brokerage transactions; brokers
often operate on a small profit margin and speed of brokerage transactions
35The value of securities sold over the counter in the United States is approximated at
twice the value of securities sold through the exchanges. A relatively small amount of listed
securities are sold over the counter.
39 Brokers are furnished with a constant stream of information as to shares offered and desired. A broker can locate with amazing rapidity a share offered for sale. In one transaction
witnessed, a Chicago broker located a certificate in a small New Jersey corporation within five
minutes after the customer requested a purchase. The selling broker was in New York.
40 Note 69 and text, infra.
4' During the boom years of the twenties, brokers operated in towns that are now without
direct brokerage service. The "traveling salesman" broker has been more prevalent in the Middie West than elsewhere. Sometimes large brokerage firms have "customer men" who travel
through the countryside.
42One Chicago firm stated they had "regular" customers as far north as Green Bay, Wis.,

a distance of

211

miles.

43The local banker sometimes opposes rather than aids brokerage interests. The country
banker, according to brokers, often discourages his customers from purchasing stock and attempts to sell them local real estate mortgages. Just how widespread this practice is has never
been determined, but many of the smaller brokers feel that it materially decreases stock purchases.
44This statement becomes less true as a speculative spirit surges through the country. Another qualification may be needed when a local community becomes enthused about a neighborhood development that is financed by a stock issue.
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underlies the liquidity of corporate shares, making them a desirable form of
investment.45 On the other hand, practices which have already been adopted
by many brokers without proving too costly or burdensome and which prevent injury to investors should be encouraged. The law, therefore, should
hold brokers to standards of conduct set by careful members of their own
group. Twenty-four brokers in Chicago, ranging from the largest to one of the
smallest, were questioned as to their practices. The information obtained constitutes the foundation for the remainder of the note.46
I. ENTRANCE OF A CERTIFICATE INTO THE

RoIKERAGE SYSTEM

The first phase of an ordinary brokerage transaction is a broker taking a
stock certificate from a non-broker either to sell on the market or to purchase
for himself.47 Controversy between the broker and the registered owner of the
certificate arises either if the owner's indorsement was forged, or if one without
authority presented the correctly indorsed certificate to the broker. There are
three alternative rules for resolving the controversy: (x) the broker is immune if he acted honestly; (2) the registered owner may sue the broker for his
stock or the value thereof; or (3) the comparative diligence of the broker and
owner is weighed, and the loss is either borne by the less careful party or is
split if both are equally careless.48 The Transfer Act adopts the first rule if the
4s Brokers' profits at the time of this writing are meager. Chicago brokers are all complaining, apparently with some justification, that the present inactive market has pushed them to
the wall. One reason for this is that many of the organizations are geared to function most
efficiently in a market such as existed in X929. See 33 Time 61 (Feb. 12, 1940).
46 It is fully recognized that the method of investigation employed to gain information for
this note is far from scientific. In a sense, the procedure followed resembles the discredited and
abandoned anthropologists' device of questioning the wise men and elders of the tribe. The
resemblance is all the more close in that brokers consider themselves as a "fraternity," and
though frequently reluctant to answer specific questions, they, just as the tribal elders and
wise men, often delight in recounting interesting experiences. In order to overcome the difficulties of obtaining accurate information, several brokers were contacted through an intermediary who possessed their confidence. But despite this precaution, the author willingly admits that his limited efforts do not furnish a satisfactory basis (such as that provided by the
Underhill Moore studies) for determining the best solutions to the problems involved. The
purpose of this note, however, is not to solve these problems, but only to raise them. It is hoped
that others will confirm the findings of the author, for it may well be that brokerage practices
are not uniform throughout the country or that the author was misinformed.
47 The first phase of a stock transaction may be a pledge of a certificate to a bank. The
bank should be treated as a broker who takes stock to sell, for the problems confronting the
bank and broker are the same, and they have identical facilities for protecting themselves.
Henceforth only "typical" brokerage transactions will be discussed. Many variations
exist, but the same principles can be applied in adjudicating controversies arising therefrom.
Special situations deserving attention will be discussed in footnotes.
48 Rule (i) makes share certificates negotiable; rule (2) makes certificates non-negotiable;
rule (3) does not make certificates negotiable, but accomplishes a similar result in some cases
by way of estoppel doctrines, Harvey, Victims of Fraud (1932) (who says we should call this
a "relative diligence" principle, rather than an estoppel principle, for the meaning of estoppel
has been overly narrowed by judicial precedents).
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certificate is genuinely indorsed and the second rule if the indorsement is forged.
But is this result sound in the light of cautious brokerage practices?
Brokers say that taking a stock certificate resembles cashing a check: there
is danger of the indorsement being forged only if the presenter is not well
known. Just as bankers will not cash checks for a stranger, brokers should
protect against a forgery by demanding sufficient identification from a stranger
who requests share certificates to be sold.49 The minimum identification that
brokers claim to require from strangers varies. Some admit being satisfied with
lodge cards, a driver's license and/or a mention of an established customer's
name. Others, more cautious, require a written or personal introduction from
a regular customer or another broker. Still other brokers assert they refuse
to deal with a stranger unless his signature is guaranteed by a bank.so The
degree of care exercised, however, may depend upon the value of the stock involved and the profit which the broker stands to make.s' Furthermore, brokers
often acquire great confidence in their powers of discernment; as one broker
said: "Regulations are regulations and rules are rules, but judgment and experience are most important. Each case must be treated separately. After all
these years I can almost feel whether I am in the presence of an honest person
or a crook."1S2 But since brokers do have expedient devices for detecting forgers
49 Curiously enough, about one-half of the brokers interviewed mentioned the check
analogy.
soThe bank guarantee of a signature is a peculiar device. Banks apparently will guarantee
the signatures of their customers, but not of strangers. Most banks will guarantee a stranger's
signature if the stranger procures a customer of the bank to guarantee it first. There is doubt
as to whether a bank is legally bound on its guaranty, Christy, The Transfer of Stock § 44
(2d ed. 194o); but brokers often consider banks to be at least morally bound. One broker
said that sometimes he is not even satisfied with a bank guaranty and requires in addition the
registered owner's signature card from a bank--so as to be able to compare signatures himself.
51Surprisingly enough, most brokers say that they do not worry much about one who presents a large block of a well-known (listed?) stock for sale. A person owning such a certificate
will be well known in the business community and can identify himself easily. Furthermore,
he will be acquainted with commercial practices and will not leave his certificate unguarded;
if the instrument is missing, he will immediately have all brokers notified via the ticker (if the
shares are listed). Certificates representing a small number of shares cause brokers the most
trouble.
S2Many brokers apparently share this view, although they do not always admit it. One
transaction witnessed at a reputable firm is interesting. A young lady asked the broker to
sell one share of American Telephone & Telegraph Company. The broker had never seen her
before, but merely asked her (i) name, (2) address, and (3) occupation. Upon being informed
she was a telephone operator, the broker took the instrument for sale, gave a receipt, and agreed
to mail a check in three days. When asked how he knew the lady was the registered owner, the
broker replied that "telephone operators often receive shares as bonuses," that "she was just
like all the rest of the telephone operators," and that "had she been attempting to sell someone
else's certificate, she would have been so nervous her teeth would have chattered!" But the
broker was not relying solely upon his ability to size up strangers, for he agreed to make the
check payable to the registered owner of the certificate, see the text of note 57, infra.

NOTES
and since many brokers at least claim to employ these devices today, the law
wisely adopts a prophylactic rule according to which brokers who accept
falsely indorsed certificates are penalized irrespective of the registered owner's
reckless conduct.53 This rule may make brokers skillful in detecting forgeries,
for the analogous Price v. Neal rule has encouraged bank tellers to develop
great skill in scrutinizing signatures.s4 Moreover, identification precautions
should be considered as part of the brokerage business, which is in a position
to insure against losses arising through forgeries.
There is little disagreement with the rule imposing liability where the broker
takes a falsely indorsed certificate, probably because commercial society considers a genuine indorsement to be a form necessary for transfer. But possibly
because there is some magic in a genuine indorsement, no one inquires whether
the broker's facilities for protecting himself are so different that his rights
should be changed when there is a correct indorsement but no authority to
transfer title. When a shareowner has indorsed his certificate and another
presents it to a broker, the broker's problem is to ascertain whether the presenter has authority to transfer share title. In defense of the Transfer Act
rule that an honest broker is protected if the owner's indorsement is genuine,
it is said:
any rule of law .... that places upon the bona fide purchaser of a stock certificate the
hazard of determining at his peril, whether or not the owner thereof freely, voluntarily,
and without fraud or misrepresentation, indorses the same for the purpose of making a
transfer thereof, would subject brokers to so great a liability as to make the risks of the
business greater than a cautious man would assume.ss
But this is not true! Brokers have two simple devices which they can and
often do use whenever an indorsed certificate is presented by one other than
the registered owner. The presenter may be required to procure on the broker's
standardized form blank a waiver signed by the registered owner and perhaps
notarized.56 More cautious brokers claim that in addition they require the
registered owner's signature to be guaranteed by a bank or the owner's signature to be on file for comparison. If the presenter says he is selling for the
registered owner, and if the broker does not wish to contact the owner to verify
the presenter's story, the broker can issue a check payable to the registered
s5The registered owner may sue the broker for converting the falsely indorsed instrument;
if the broker still has the certificate, the owner may recover it. Note 68 infra.
s Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355 (1762).
ss Negotiability of Corporate Stock, 17 Va. L. Rev. 486, 488 (1931), quoting from the Petition of Sloss and Ackerman, Amid Curiae, for a Hearing in Bank, in Powers v. Pacific
Diesel Engine Co., 266 Pac. 8oi (Cal. 1928), rev'd 2o6 Cal. 334, 274 Pac. 512 (1929).

s6 Requiring a signed waiver does not afford complete protection to investors, who may be
duped into signing a waiver or who may leave signed waivers with their certificates. But both
of these happenings are unlikely, and furthermore, a broker may well be suspicious of a stranger
who already has a waiver from the registered owner. Perhaps the broker should require the
customer to have the registered owner sign the broker's own waiver blank.
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owner. 7 The presenter must then either procure the indorsement of the owner,
in which event a fraud will be detected, or forge the indorsement, in which case
the bank must either detect the forgery or re-credit the broker's account. How
can these practices be called too burdensome on brokers?
If a broker not employing the foregoing protective devices takes a correctly
indorsed instrument from a thief, finder, or one without selling authority, why
should not the broker bear the loss despite the registered owner's carelessness? s5
Knowing that indorsed instruments are sometimes lost or misappropriated,
brokers should be on guard when one other than the registered owner offers
certificates for sale. The brokerage business is in many ways a public service,
and part of that service certainly should include adopting simple devices which
would protect the property interests of investors5 9 Furthermore, the individual
stockholder is rarely in a position to insure against loss, theft, or misappropriation of his certificates, whereas brokers can carry insurance against selling
stock without the shareowner's consent. As a matter of record, many large
brokers and a few small ones carry such insurance and usually do not feel that
the premiums are too high. 60 The usual provision in these policies relieving
the insurance company of liability if the broker fails to exercise "reasonable
care" tends to promote cautious brokerage practices.
Not only is the Transfer Act rule protecting the subjectively honest broker
unnecessary but it may have deleterious effects. A substantial evil in our society is the professional "fence"-the person or organization specializing in the
purchase of stolen items. Theoretically the fence should be eliminated through
enforcement of the criminal law, but actually the fence has managed to operate
with many articles despite threatened criminal penalties. Property law must
take the fence into consideration. Not much traffic in stolen share certificates
S7Many stock transactions are carried on by an owner's authorized agent. Where there
has been a course of dealings through a certain agent, the broker should be able to trade with
the agent without contacting the registered owner each time. Normal agency principles should
govern rights in this situation, and the owner should be required to notify the broker when the
agency is terminated.
S8 If the registered owner is another broker, perhaps we should adopt a comparative diligence test in adjudicating the controversy. For even though the broker taking the instrument
for sale is in a position to verify his customer's authority, it seems unfair to place the loss on
him if the other broker was even more careless in losing the instrument. Therefore, the general
principles advocated in this note perhaps should be restricted to where the registered owner is
outside the brokerage system.
59Even if all brokers adopted the protective devices, investors would not be completely
protected. One who wrongfully acquires a correctly indorsed instrument could have the corporation issue a new certificate in his name and then sell the new instrument through a broker.
Perhaps we should prevent this occurrence by requiring that a licensed broker or a bank or
trust company must certify that the registered owner has authorized the transfer. Note 81
and text, infra.
6
0 No premium figures could be obtabibd, but several brokers suggested that in computing
premiums insurance companies considered the size of the brokerage firm and the firm's care-

fulness.
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-has been uncovered, probably because registration of share certificates increases
the fence's inability to dispose of the shares; the absence of registration expedites traffic in stolen bearer bonds. Nevertheless, brokerage circles have at
times been troubled by "shady houses" which close their eyes in purchasing
stolen certificates. 6' A pretense of honesty is rather simple, so that the Transfer
Act provision is a boon to the very institutions that we should exterminate.
A second evil which the Transfer Act fosters is the professional swindler
who procures indorsed certificates through misrepresenting that he is the
issuing company's agent for exchanging certificates, attempts to sell the
shares, and to pocket the proceeds. Today the swindler often tries selling
to or through brokers, who are protected by the act as long as they appear to
be "honest." 62 Holding brokers to a more stringent standard of conduct would
terminate one of the swindler's chief outlets. Perhaps, however, the swindler
might be driven to selling only directly to the public, and this must be considered in discussing transactions outside the brokerage system.
Besides being unjustified and perhaps having deleterious effects, the Transfer
Act's negotiability and good faith provisions require of brokers a lower standard of conduct than they have set for themselves. Most brokers do much more
than merely act "honestly," even when they know the law will protect them.
The reasons for this are far from altruistic. Brokerage houses like to be considered as "substantial" or "conservative" firms, and so they often attempt
to impress new customers with extremely cautious business methods.63 Furthermore, litigation is costly, furnishes bad publicity, reveals agency secrets, and
sometimes necessitates political intrigues; consequently brokers usually attempt
to stay out of the courts. 64 The broker's attitude is not changed by carrying insurance, since increased litigation may mean higher premiums in future years.
Finally, among honest brokers it is a matter of pride to frustrate a crook and
avoid being fooled by a "slicker." In the light of these considerations it is
dubious whether the Transfer Act provision protecting "honest" brokers will
encourage less cautious brokerage practices among reputable firms which today
inno way differentiate between stock certificates that are governed by the
61 Brokers seem reluctant to admit that there are such things as "shady houses." But after
extensive questioning, quite a few brokers said they "sort of recall" firms that "may have been
involved in suspicious purchases and sales."
62The best evidence that swindlers operate in this manner is that many brokers have foiled
attempts of swindlers to unload securities. One broker mentioned that he had uncovered a
pair of swindlers who had defrauded a large number of shareholders in Iowa and who were attempting to sell the securities in Chicago. Even though the swindlers had obtained signature
guarantees by a large national bank, the broker was suspicious because the swindlers had
certificates of many different registered owners.
63A broker usually makes only a small profit from a single deal and, therefore, must rely
on volume in his transactions. The broker, consequently, attempts to gain his customer's
confidence, and one way of doing this is by a display of conservatism. But carelessness in the
form of a "favor" may also accomplish the desired result.
64One broker summarized this attitude by saying: "Rather lose a sale than win a lawsuit."
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act and those that are not. But is it wise policy to have legal standards below
those which the "profession" sets for itself? The competition in laxity among
less responsible brokers must inevitably lead to a lowering of the standards by
some members of the profession to that sanctioned by the law.
On the other hand, requiring brokers to adopt cautious business methods
would slow up brokerage transactions only to an imperceptible extent. If it is
true that most brokers exercise greater caution than is demanded by law,
brokerage practices will not be affected if the law requires that greater caution.
Aside from this, very few share transfers are materially impeded by the protective devices. Seldom is a certificate brought to a broker by one other than
the registered owner or the owner's regular agent. But even when another does
present the instrument, the registered owner usually can be contacted promptly.
Only in the exceptional case where the registered owner cannot be reached and
the presenter is unwilling to take a check made out jointly to himself and the
registered owner will there be a delay until the corporation transfers the shares
to the presenter. 65 But even this exceptional delay should not be cause for
concern. If the situation arises at all, it probably will be in connection with
less active stocks, for such shares are more likely to be transferred between
private individuals (i.e., from the registered owner to the presenter). Speed of
disposal is usually unimportant if the stock is inactive. Moreover, the presenter deserves no sympathy, for he probably acted in an unbusinesslike manner in not having had the shares transferred into his name at the time of
acquisition.66
2. MOVEMENT OP A CERTIFICATE THROUGH THE BROKERAGE SYSTEM

The second phase of an ordinary brokerage transaction is sale of stock by
a broker to another broker who purchases for a customer. 67 The typical situation causing controversy is where the selling broker forwards a falsely indorsed
certificate or a genuinely indorsed certificate which was presented to him by
one having no authority to transfer title. We saw in the previous discussion
that the registered owner should be able to recover damages from the selling
broker. But what are the registered owner's rights against the purchasing
broker in case the selling broker is insolvent? These rights may depend upon
whether the selling broker forwards to the buying broker (i) the registered
owner's certificate, or (2) a certificate in the name of a broker. We shall con6

S The device of a check made payable to both the presenter and registered owner is apparently unusual, for only one broker mentioned having used it. The advantage of such a check
is that the presenter can send it to the registered owner for indorsement without running the
risk of loss if the registered owner cashes the instrument and absconds with the money.
6See p. 515 infra; cf. note 86 and text, infra.
67 The second phase of a brokerage transaction might be a pledge of the certificate by the
broker to a bank or another broker. The pledgee's rights should be similar to those of a purchasing broker, whether the pledgee is a bank or a broker. See note 47 supra.
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sider the governing precedents and determine whether they are justified under
modern brokerage practices.
Under the Transfer Act an honest purchasing broker is completely protected
if he acquires a correctly indorsed certificate. If he obtains a falsely indorsed
instrument, however, the registered owner thereof may sue in conversion or for
return of the certificate. 8 The argument made in support of this distinction is
that the purchasing broker should be able to rely on a correct indorsement and
should not be required to inquire whether the registered owner authorized the
sale of his shares. But the argument rests on a faulty assumption. The purchasing broker never relies on the regularity of the registered owner's indorsement, for he does not know the owner's signature and is in no position to verify
its authenticity. Rather than relying on the owner's indorsement, the purchasing broker relies on the selling broker's guaranty that all necessary indorsements are regular. Both the Transfer Act and brokerage custom provide for
this seller's warranty which places the primary pecuniary loss on the personusually a broker-who receives the instrument from the forger. 69 But since the
purchasing broker has no better facilities to confirm the registered owner's
authorization to transfer the shares than to verify the owner's indorsement, a
similar rule should be adopted in the two situations. The purchasing broker
should rely on the selling broker using due caution in taking the certificate for
sale, and if the selling broker failed to confirm his customer's authority to sell,
the purchasing broker should be liable to the owner and should have his recourse against the selling broker. Under this rule, purchasing brokers would
require selling brokers to guarantee against adverse claims of the registered
owner, as well as to certify all indorsements as genuine. In other words, selling
brokers would be required, as under stock exchange rules, to make "good de68

Angus v. Cincinnati Morris Plan Bank, 56 Ohio App. 444, io N.E. (2d) io9 (1938);
Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 260 N.Y. 26, 182 N.E. 235 (1932). Conversion, however, has been attacked
as being an inappropriate remedy, 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. i74 (i933). It is said that since a certificate merely evidences a share, and since the registered owner cannot lose his share through
losing an unindorsed certificate, a purchaser of the falsely indorsed instrument does not disturb the owner's share title, Pierpoint v. Farnum, 234 App. Div. 205, 254 N.Y. Supp. 758
(i93i), rev'd Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 26o N.Y. 26, 182 N.E. 235 (1932) over a vigorous dissent by

Justice Lehman; Steffen, A Proposed Uniform Act Making Investment Instruments Negotiable, 34 Col. L. Rev. 632, 653 (1934). As a substitute for conversion it is urged that the owner
should merely recover his certificate plus damages for loss of title evidence. It seems, however,
that a conversion action usually accomplishes an equivalent result: conversion would be
brought only if the value of the owner's share has declined; the damages for loss of title evidence would normally equal this decline, for without a certificate the owner could not sell his
share at the higher price; therefore, title evidence damages plus retention of his share will net
the owner a total value equal to that recoverable in conversion.
69Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § ii. But does the selling broker make the Transfer Act
warranty on his own behalf or on behalf of the person for whom he is selling the certificate?
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livery"--i.e., delivery of unquestioned certificates.70 The result would not be
harsh, for as in the forged indorsement situation, the buying broker must take
care to trade with financially responsible brokers. The result, furthermore,
would again shift the ultimate pecuniary loss to the party best able to avoid
it-the broker who originally takes the instrument for sale.
Brokers treat all shares alike, and in selling a customer's share, the broker
may for convenience deliver someone else's certificate to the buying broker.
This is ordinarily done when there is need for an immediate delivery and the
selling broker has or can borrow a certificate in the buying broker's city. Usually in these cases the certificate delivered is in a broker's name and is referred
to as a "street certificate." The purchasing broker under these circumstances
is not considered as buying the share of the selling broker's customer, but
rather as taking a "street share."71 Consequently, if an owner's share is received by the selling broker from a forger or from one having no authority to
sell, and a street certificate is then forwarded by the selling broker, the pur72
chasing broker is immune from claims of the wronged owner.
70The New York Stock Exchange, for example, has the following rules governing reclamations of securities:
RuLE F.P. iI6. "Definition. The term 'reclamation' as used in these rules means a claim for
the right to return, or to demand the return of, a security previously accepted."
RuLE F.P. I12. "Manner of Settlement. When a security is returned or reclaimed, the party
who delivered it shall immediately give the party presenting it either the security in proper
form for delivery in exchange for the security originally delivered or the current money
value thereof. In the latter case, unless otherwise agreed, the party to whom the security
is returned shall be deemed to be failing to deliver the security until such time as a proper
delivery is made."
RULE F.P. i3. "Minor Irregularities. Reclamation for an irregularity which affects only
the currency of the security in the market shall be made within ten days from the day of
original delivery."
Rurs F.P. 117. "Lost and Stolen Securities-Imperfect Title. Reclamation by reason of the
fact that title to a security is called in question, or a security is reported to have been lost
or stolen, may be made without limit of time, and such security may be returned to the
party who introduced it into the market."
Ruxi F.P. irg. "Special Circumstances. The Committee may make speclal rulings in circumstances not specifically referred to in these rules. The Committee may also make special
rulings in particular cases, in spite of any general rule herein contained, if, in the opinion of
the Committee, there are equitable considerations therefor," excerpts from Rules Adopted
by the Committee on Floor Procedure Pertaining to the Settlement of Exchange Contracts, New York Stock Exchange (Adopted May r6, 1938).
71 It perhaps could be argued that even though the selling broker forwards a borrowed street
certificate, the purchasing broker acquires the registered owner's share. But this view would
be realistic only if certificates were not closely associated with shares. Today, however, we
think of each certificate as representing a specific share.
72The selling broker takes the ultimate loss under the Transfer Act if the indorsement of
the registered owner's certificate is forged: the corporation will refuse to transfer the certificate, and the broker will become liable on his warranty or guarantee if he sells the instrument.
Under the principles advocated in this note, the selling broker should also bear the loss if he
takes a correctly indorsed instrument from one without authority to sell it.
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The purchasing broker usually transfers the certificate he receives into his
customer's name because the customer will not be entitled to receive dividends
or vote until registered on the corporate books. By transferring the certificate,
the purchasing broker's rights should in no way be improved; if he is liable
to the registered owner for merely purchasing the latter's instrument, then
clearly he should be liable if in addition he procures a transfer thereof." The
transfer also brings the broker into contact with the corporation.74 If the broker
procures transfer of a falsely indorsed certificate he will be liable to the corporation on his "implied warranty" that the owner's indorsement is regular.75
The implied warranty has been attacked as being unrealistic, but it accords
with accepted transfer practices.76 Corporations and their transfer agents are
in a difficult position to verify indorsements; they do not become expert in
recognizing signatures since they seldom execute many transfers for a single
registered owner (as a bank pays many checks of a depositor).77 Transfer agents
usually overcome their difficulty by requiring a broker, bank, or trust company
73The former registered owner perhaps might sue to have the new certificate cancelled or
transferred to him on a constructive trust theory, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 484, 500 (7939).
74 The Transfer Act does not provide remedies for corporate refusal to make a transfer.
At common law one who purchased a certificate which the corporation refuses to transfer
could claim a conversion and recover the share value or compel a transfer in equity, Va. Pub.
Service Co. v. Steindler, i66 Va. 686, 187 S.E. 353 (1936); St. Romes v. Levee Steam Cotton
Press Co., X27 U.S. 614 (i888). Courts have rejected the contention that under the Transfer
Act a corporation must convert the certificate in order to convert the stock, Booth v. Cincinnati Finance Co., i9 Ohio App. 130 (1923).
7s Boston & Albany R. Co. v. Richardson, i35 Mass. 473 (1883); Starkey v. Bank of
England, [igo3] A. C. 774 (H. L.); Boston Tow Boat Co. v. Medford Nat'l Bank, 232 Mass.
38, 127 N.E. 49x (i979). A guaranty of the owner's indorsement by a third party does not
terminate the procurer's implied warranty, Lake Superior Corp. v. Rebre, 65 Pa. Super. Ct.
379 (I917). A danger in implying a procurer's warranty is that corporate negligence, though
hindering the procurer's pursuit of the forger, is unpenalized, since negligence is no defense to
a suit on a warranty.
6

7 Ames suggested that we should think of the broker as presenting to the corporation a

writing purporting to be the registered owner's order on the corporation to substitute the
presenter or his nominee as shareholder, Ames, Forged Transfers of Stock: Another View,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 543, 546 (i904); cf. Thorndike, Forged Transfers of Stock and the Sheffield
Case, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1904); see Corporation of Sheffield v. Barclay, [79o3] I K. B. i,
rev'd [i9o3] 2 K. B. 58o (C.A.); rev'd again, [i9o5] A. C. 392 (H.L.). The corporation would
then be in an analogous situation to a drawee bank; under the Price v. Neal rule, the corporation would have to determine the extent of its duty, and if it acted on a forged signature, it
could not recover for its mistake, see Christy, Transfer of Stock § 3 (2d ed. i94o). But even if
the broker procuring a transfer does not impliedly warrant the owner's indorsement, the corporation may obtain recovery through derived rights: If the registered owner can sue the
broker for converting his share (see note 68 supra), but instead elects to remain a shareholder,
the corporation by recognizing him as such may become subrogated to his conversion action.
77 For the problems confronting a corporation or its transfer agent, see Dewey, The Transfer Agent's Dilemma: Conflicting Claims to Shares of Stock, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (1939).
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to "guarantee" the owner's indorsement.78 Thus aside from any implied warranties, the risk of forgery is expressly placed on the brokerage system; and
the ultimate loss is once again shifted to the broker who initially accepted the
falsely indorsed instrument.
Under the Transfer Act, a corporation is protected in cancelling a genuinely
indorsed certificate. 79 If the registered owner has inserted a "stop transfer"
order, the corporation should notify the rival claimants and await an adjudication of their rights before issuing a new certificate. 8o In the absence of a "stop"
the corporation need not be concerned with whether the registered owner
authorized transfer of the indorsed instrument. But perhaps if we require a
selling broker to certify to a buying broker that the registered owner had
authorized a transfer (as suggested previously), we should also require a broker
seeking a new certificate to guarantee the same to the corporation."
3.

EXIT OF A CERTIFICATE FROMLTHE BROKERAGE SYSTEM

The last phase of a normal brokerage transaction is delivery of a certificate
by the purchasing broker to his customer. 82 Controversy involving the customer arises when the share purchased is or was represented by a certificate
that had been either falsely indorsed or sold without the registered owner's
authority. The rights of the customer may depend upon whether the purchasing broker delivers to the customer (i) a new certificate in the customer's name,
(2) the registered owner's instrument, or (3) a street certificate.
As was stated previously, the purchasing broker usually obtains a certificate
in his customer's name through procuring a transfer of the registered owner's
instrument. Is the customer thereafter fully protected from claims of the corporation even though the registered owner's instrument was falsely indorsed?
The general rule is that a corporation may cancel a new certificate issued under
these circumstances provided the instrument has not been passed on by the
procurer to a bona fide purchaser8 3 But what is the status of the purchasing
7SChristy, Transfer of Stock § 44

(2d

ed. 194o). There is some question whether a bank

guarantee is ultra vires. See note 5o supra.
79Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 67,

(1924). This is true even though a finder
or thief requests the transfer.
soChristy, Transfer of Stock c. 18 (2d ed. i94o).
81This procedure would invalidate the usual argument that in the absence of a "stop,"
the corporation has no convenient means of determining whether the registered owner has
consented to the transfer.

82The selling broker may sell directly to an investor. In that event, the selling broker is a

purchasing broker as far as the buyer-investor is concerned.
83 Cancellation, which is a form of rescission, rests on mutual mistake, if the forgery was
unsuspected, or on fraud, if the procurer knew the signature was false. Brown, Lancaster &
Co. v. Howard Fire Ins. Co., 42 Md. 384 (1875); see Simm v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., L.R. 5
Q.B.D. 188 (1879); Hambleton v. Central Ohio R. Co., 44 Md. 551 (1876). Since the corporation must continue to recognize the owner of the falsely indorsed and cancelled certificate as a
shareholder (unless he chooses to sue in conversion), and since the new certificate becomes

binding on the corporation when transferred to a bona fide purchaser (see Rand v. Hercules
Powder Co., 129 Misc. 891, 223 N.Y. Supp. 383 (1927)), two shares may be created out of a
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broker's customer? It is unrealistic to call the customer a bona fide purchaser
of the new certificate for it is issued directly to him, and although the
broker actually procures the transfer, the broker acts only as the customer's
agent. But allowing the corporation to cancel the new certificate seems harsh
to the customer, 4 who usually does not see the registered owner's certificate.
Upon receiving the new instrument, the customer relies on the corporation's
implied representation that everything is in order. Furthermore, the controversy is between a corporation and a private investor, and we should limit the
corporation to recourse against the guarantor of the registered owner's signature
or the broker (or individual) who procured the transfer8 1 This provision would
tend to give increased security to stock acquisitions-a desirable result for
stock investments generally.
Frequently an investor or speculator desires to remain off of the corpora86
tion's books and consequently asks his broker for an indorsed street certificate.
The purchasing broker may furnish a street certificate that he already has,
borrow one from another broker,' or procure one through transferring the
registered owner's instrument. Even if the last-mentioned procedure is followed,
the broker's customer is immune from the claims of the former registered
owner, for the customer is a bona fide purchaser of the new (i.e., street name)
certificate. The fact that a broker's customer is protected from the claims of
the corporation or of the former registered owner when the customer receives
a certificate in a broker's name should be an additional reason for immunizing
the customer when he receives a certificate in his own name.
A wronged registered owner's certificate that enters the brokerage system
will seldom come into the hands of a broker's customer, but when it does, how
should rights be adjusted?87 On the one hand, the purchasing broker should be
single share. Difficulty arises when recognizing both shares would result in an over-issue and
there is no available share which the corporation could purchase and cancel. Cf. Moores v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Piqua, xi U.S. 156 (1884); Prince v. Childs Co. 23 F. (2d) 6o5 (C.C.A.
2d 1928); Giffon v. American Safety Razor Co., 134 Misc. 140, 234 N.Y. Supp. 646 (1929);
Pratt v. Taunton Copper Co., 123 Mass. iio (1877); Machinists' Nat'l Bank v. Field, 126
Mass. 345 (1879); State v. Bank of Baton Rouge, 125 La. 138, 5i So. 95 (191o). An excellent
discussion of the problem is in 23 Minn. L. Rev. 484, 495-8 (1939).
84 Christy, Transfer of Stock § 242 (2d. ed. 194o).
85This rule avoids multiplicity of actions. If the corporation cancelled the purchaser's
certificate, the purchaser would sue his broker. So why not force the corporation to sue the
broker directly?
6
8 Remaining off the corporate registry may be prompted by a desire (i) to obtain a large
block of shares without letting others know that one man is purchasing all the shares, (2) to
prevent other speculators and investors from knowing the stocks in which the particular
speculator is dabbling, or (3) to conceal an embarrassing incompatible relationship arising
out of the investor's other capacities.
87 Brokers rarely deliver to their customers someone else's certificate, for the customer will
not be able to vote or receive dividends until he is registered on the corporate books. Furthermore, if the customer received another investor's certificate, he might feel as though he were
not obtaining "his own share."
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liable to his customer for not making "good delivery," for the broker alone can
obtain assurances that the purchased instrument effectively passes share title.
a
Unfortunately, the legal precedents indicate that a broker need act only as '88
reasonable broker and not "as a principal, or a guarantor, or as insurer.
But since many brokers today replace controverted instruments as a matter
of policy, a similar legal requirement (as a corollary of the principles suggested
previously) would not place an unduly heavy burden on brokers. 89 On the
other hand, the registered owner of the certificate should be able to sue (as
suggested previously) either the purchasing or selling broker.9o Therefore, only
where the purchasing broker and selling broker (who may be one person) are
insolvent should any serious problem arise in adjusting rights between the
broker's customer and the registered owner. If the owner's certificate was
falsely indorsed, the owner undoubtedly should retain his share, for a correct
indorsement is a form necessary to transfer a share; the purchaser's recourse
must be against the insolvent broker or brokers. However, since the controversy is between two private investors, if the registered owner's certificate was
regularly indorsed in blank but transferred without the owner's authorization,
the share should be awarded to the more diligent2 party.9' If both were equally
careful or reckless, the loss might well be split.9
B. TRANSACTIONS OUTSDE TEM BROKERAGE SYSTEM

Stock transfers outside the brokerage system generally fall into two classes:
(i) transfer of shares between acquaintances and (2) sale of shares by a stranger.
The desirability of negotiability in share transfers between friends cannot
easily be determined. The problem of adverse title claims arises only when
the transferor gives a certificate in someone else's name. This situation will
rarely occur, but should it occur, it can be argued that the transferee relies on
his friend rather than on the certificate. The typical transaction outside the
brokerage system that raises the negotiability problem is a sale by a non-broker
stranger of a third person's certificate. How should the conflicting rights of
owner and purchaser be resolved if the indorsement was forged or if the stranger
had no authority to pass title? The Transfer Act protects the honest purchaser
if the indorsement is regular and protects the owner if the indorsement is forged.
88 1 Meyer, The Law of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges 265 (I931), citing Isham v.
Post, 141 N.Y. io, 35 N.E. 1084 (1894); Peckham v. Ketchum, 5Bosw. (N.Y. Super. CL) 5o6

(r85g).
8

9All but one of the brokers interviewed said they felt obligated to replace a contested
instrument.
90Notes 58 and 68 and text, supra.
91See Harvey, Victims of Fraud c. 4 (1932).
9'Another situation in which this remedy might be resorted to is where both the former
registered owner and the broker's customer want the shares represented by the certificate,
and no other shares can be purchased on the market. If the purchaser and former owner
were equally diligent, the shares represented by the contested certificate should be split between the two, and each should have a remedy against the brokers involved for the additional
shares.
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This result is indefensible. The purchaser does not rely on the registered owner's
indorsement when purchasing from a third-party stranger, since the purchaser
never knows the registered owner's signature. Furthermore, the registered
owner may have been even more careless in suffering a forgery of the unindorsed certificate than in becoming separated from the indorsed instrument.
Clearly some other standard is necessary.
One suggestion is to deny protection to those purchasing from non-broker
strangers. The state licenses security brokers, thereby indicating that it considers stock transactions as dangerous and as needing control; if one wants to
purchase from a non-broker, he should do so at his own risk. Moreover, sale
of securities in a tavern or kitchen is not the liquidity and salability desired.
Too often swindlers dispose of their securities in this manner, and we should
hesitate to protect purchasers who even unconsciously aid swindlers. Furthermore, the average person should immediately suspect a non-broker stranger
who attempts to sell stock; investigation and identification are dictated by
common sense, and a mere "clear conscience" should be insufficient to warrant
protection by the law.
The prophylactic rule, however, seems too harsh. After all, the purchaser is
only an ordinary individual who is susceptible to being misled. The other
claimant of the stock, the registered owner, may also have been misled, or
perhaps even careless or negligent. There is no necessity to apply a simple,
arbitrary rule to adjust their rights. The conduct of the claimants should be
weighed and the stock awarded to the more careful of the two. If both acted
with approximately equal care, splitting of the loss between them should be
required, because they were, in a sense, both victims of the same wrong.
IV. CONCLUSION

At the time the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (formerly labeled the Transfer
of Stock Act) was approved by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, it was said:
The intention of the Conference with regard to the Transfer of Stock Act .... has
been to make [share certificates] fully negotiable ..... These documents of title were
already clothed with a quasi-negotiable character by mercantile usage and judicial decision ..... The test of the wisdom of [the Commissioners'] action is not to be found
in any appeal to a theoretical standard or the authority of tradition, but whether or
not they have acted in response to the prevailing sentiment among business interests.93
The Conference's attitude, although perhaps necessary to expedite adoption
of the proposed act, reflects an inadequate examination into the nature of
negotiability.94
93Proceedings of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 102 (Igio).
94 MacChesney, for example, thought that share certificates should not be made negotiable,
and as an Illinois Commissioner on Uniform Laws voted against the proposed act. Later,
however, he said: "Nevertheless, I regard it as so highly necessary that the rule upon such a
question should be uniform that now that this act has been recommended by the National Conference and adopted by a large number of the leading States, that I would earnestly recommend
that Illinois adopt it also." MacChesney, Uniform State Laws 55 (1916).
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"Negotiability" primarily describes a legal adjustment of conflicting assertions to rights represented by a writing:95 the purchaser's expectations as created by the appearance of the paper are protected as if he had actually relied on
its contents. 9 6 This protection is extended despite existence of adverse title
claims of former owners or of defenses of the maker, which, in the absence of
negotiability, could otherwise be asserted9 7 The adoption by the law of such
an adjustment of rights rests upon an attitude developed in society, and more
particularly, commercial society, toward the instruments involved. This attitude is complex but may be characterized basically as follows: Probably because the instrument is frequently transferred in response to business needs, the
interested community closely associates the paper with the right represented
thereby. The close identity means that psychologically people do not distinguish
the chose from the evidence of the chose, and possession of the instrument gives
rise to a presumption that the possessor may enforce or transfer the claim represented. This attitude crystallizes in respect to instruments exhibiting certain
formalities and those dealing with the paper tend to feel secure without looking
behind the writing when the forms are present. In this environmental background the law is called upon to adjudicate conflicting claims in respect to the
rights represented by the formalized paper. Because the commercial society
regards the paper as highly representative of the underlying claim, the lawmakers suspect there must be a good commercial or business reason for this
attitude. If some such reason can be found, the law-makers believe that the
9s Historically, negotiability originally referred only to the assignability of an instrument
promising a payment to the bearer thereof or to the nominee of a person named in the writing,
see Holdsworth, The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments, 31 L.Q. Rev. 12,
173, 376 (1915); 32 L.Q. Rev. 20 (1g16); Ewart, Estoppel by Misrepresentation 384 (1goo).
Transferees of such paper were later permitted to sue in their own name, and it could then be
said that the obligor made an independent promise to each person in the chain of title, see
Hussey v. Jacob, z Salk. 344 (1696); Holdsworth, ibid., 31 L.Q. Rev. 173, 182-4 (,9,5);
Jenks, On the Early History of Negotiable Instruments, 9 L.Q. Rev. 70 (1893). The adoption
of this view meant that the rights of a holder were not subject to the obligor's defenses against
predecessors in title. With attention centered on the holder's position, it was also easy to condude that if the holder's title were in order, his rights should not be affected by adverse title
claims of prior owners of the instrument, see Anonymous, i Salk. 126 (1698). Negotiability
thus took on a new meaning and now referred to freedom of a right from prior infirmities after
transfer of an instrument representing the right. When many other types of claims were made
assignable, this new meaning became the primary one.
96 "Actual reliance" is used to mean parting with value on the faith of the signature of the
person being sued on the instrument, see note 99 supra. In the case of share certificates there
is always reliance on the corporation's implied promise to recognize the shares represented by
the certificate.
97 By protecting a purchaser's expectations, negotiability does not lessen the protection
afforded property rights. A purchaser's interest in his purchase is as much a property right
as is an owner's interest in his possessions; therefore negotiability merely protects the security
of acquisition property interests at the expense of ownership property interests. Unfortunately
we have been conditioned to think that the purchaser acquires a property interest in his purchase only if he can secure specific enforcement of the purchase contract.
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legal counterpart of the businessman's attitude should be that one who gives
value in bona fide reliance on the accepted forms ought to be protected in his
expectations. When the law adopts this position with reference to an instrument, we say that instrument is "negotiable." By making the instrument negotiable, the law protects the "dynamic institution of exchange."9 8
From the foregoing analysis, two propositions can be derived that are of
paramount importance in considering the negotiability of share certificates.
Firstly, negotiability is a form of estoppel.99 Negotiable instruments contain
"ambulatory promises"; the owner of such an instrument who creates an appearance that he has transferred his rights should be estopped to assert title
claims against subsequent holders, other than the immediate transfereeY0° The
rationale of the estoppel analysis is that, measured by the rough standards of
the business community, the former owner who is asserting an adverse title
claim must have been more careless than the purchaser. The purchaser acquired the instrument in the ordinary course of business, while the former owner
either trusted a wrongdoer, lost his instrument, or enabled a thief to obtain the
99Houston, The Enforcement of Decrees in Equity
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(Igr5).

99Ewart, Estoppel by Misrepresentation c. xxiv (igoo).
lo As to terminating the obligor's defenses, Ewart says that one who makes a promise to
the bearer of an instrument or to a named party's nominee makes an "ambulatory promise."
When a "promisee" in the chain of title attempts to enforce the promise, the obligor is estopped
to assert that he received no consideration or that he has a defense against the holder's predecessors in title. Ewart goes on to say that if "negotiability" merely means "transferability,"
the term should be discarded because it is too confusing. Ibid., at c. xxiv.
The Ewart estoppel analysis may account for instruments being negotiable, but it fails to
explain why some instruments containing ambulatory promises are not negotiable. History
reveals that certain formalities have always been prerequisite to negotiability, American Nat'l
Bank of San Francisco v. Sommerville, i9i Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923). Estoppel analysis

can explain the need for forms by saying that in the light of commercial practices there can be
reasonable reliance only when certain forms are present. But estoppel cannot explain the
origin of the particular forms that are required. An examination of institutions must therefore
supplement any theory of negotiability.
It should be noticed that the Ewart analysis explains why acting in good faith and parting
with value are prerequisites for asserting the negotiable benefits: giving value is often considered the only means to satisfy the estoppel requirement of detrimental reliance, and bad
faith bars the privilege of claiming an estoppel. But the analysis must overcome two conceptualistic obstacles to make this explanation satisfactory: (i) Traditional estoppel notions
require actual reliance on the representation of the person estopped, Bigelow, The Law of
Estoppel c. 18 (I903). In practice, however, a purchaser of a negotiable instrument may have
relied solely upon his transferor's indorsement without reference to the principal obligor's
undertaking, and yet the law does not consider this as improving the principal obligor's rights.
Perhaps traditional estoppel notions of reliance are too narrow. See the risk of reliance
analysis in Promissory Obligations Based on Past Benefits or Other Moral Consideration, 7
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 124 (1939). (2) The estoppel analysis does not explain what is necessary
for "good faith." It is very likely that the good faith notion which arose in connection with
estoppel differs from that which grew out of the mercantile transactions giving rise to negotiable instruments. But commercial bona fideness could be incorporated into that part of
estoppel relating to commercial instruments.
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instrument in a form effective to transfer title. Applying this rationale to share
certificates, the standard of good faith set by the Transfer Act, under which a
purchaser may ignore good business practices and still be bona fide, cannot be
defended. The Transfer Act completely disregards the existence of an extensive
brokerage system, the presence of which means that in most stock transactions,
purchasers (i.e., brokers) as a class may be distinguished from investors (i.e.,
owners) as a class. The professional broker should be held to a different standard of conduct from the private investor. The careful broker claims that he
never handles a certificate without verifying the registered owner's authorization. If this is true, the estoppel argument can no longer be made: the purchasing broker must have been careless in taking the instrument for sale; regardless of the registered owner's carelessness, the broker should have detected
the absence of the owner's authorization to make a transfer; therefore, as against
the broker or anyone claiming through him, the registered owner should not be
estopped to assert his adverse title.
Secondly, the mere fact that the commercial community considers certificates
as highly representative of the underlying shares and desires the paper to be
negotiable is not in itself sufficient reason for the law to immunize a bona fide
purchaser of the writing from adverse title claims. The desire must be supported by a genuine commercial or business need for negotiability, which need
must sufficiently offset any disadvantages that would result to other interests
in the society. A good plea for negotiability can be made along these lines on
behalf of the older negotiable instruments. The negotiability of checks, for
instance, promotes their function as payment devices insofar as check transactions can be closed within the shortest possible period. The negotiability of
bills and notes originally served a similar purpose for it developed at a time
when these instruments served as media of payment and transferring funds.
Moreover, bills and notes were for short terms and circulated from hand to hand
among merchants without the intervention of a professional broker or banker. The negotiable character of the instruments, once established, made them
eminently useful as short term credit devices because readily discountable
and rediscountable; negotiability aids both completion and discount. And
throughout their development, the ownership property interest in these writings was relatively small and could be sacrificed to commercial expediency.Io°
But share certificates are usually investments that are retained for long periods
of time. The ownership property interest is consequently of great importance.
On the other hand, there is no genuine need for the negotiability of share certificates in our present society. This note has suggested that most stock transactions are handled by professional brokers and bankers, who act as though
101Some notes are made for long terms, but these are usually held by banks or insurance
companies, rather than private individuals. For a discussion on how the law should reconcile
business interests with other interests in the society, see Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of
the Sociology of Law (1936).
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certificates were not negotiable. The fluidity of share certificates within the
brokerage system depends not upon negotiability, but upon confidence between
brokers. It is at the point where a certificate enters brokerage or banking channels that negotiability has its greatest significance. Negotiability at that point
serves to protect careless brokers and bankers who introduce certificates into
the brokerage system without confirming the registered owner's authorization
to transfer the shares. This protection is at the expense of private investors,
who as a class, cannot protect themselves with the ease or effectiveness that
brokers can.
THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939: LIMITATIONS ON THE
TRUSTEE'S PRIVILEGE OF LENDING TO THE OBLIGOR
Most trust companies which serve as trustees for indenture security issues
are also commercial bankers making short-term loans., It may happen, therefore, that such companies will occupy the dual position of indenture trustee and
creditor of the obligor on the indenture securities. As trustee, the trust company's duty to the bondholders requires that it refrain from any action which
may diminish the value of the property available to the indenture security holders to satisfy the indenture lien or claim; as a bank creditor, the trust company's
duty to its depositors and stockholders compel it, in conformity with sound
banking practice, to make itself whole on any outstanding loans to the obligor.
Because of the risk that such a trustee-creditor may disregard its fiduciary
duties to the investor, the Trust Indenture Act of 19392 requires a qualified indenture to contain certain provisions3 which protect the indenture security
holder against the trustee's improving its position as creditor within four months
of default on the indenture obligation.4
Prior to the Trust Indenture Act, there were but few suits to compel a corporate trustee to share with investors any preferential payments which were
made by the obligor on debts to the trustee and which were received by the
xFor example, see SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities,
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, pt. VI, Trustees under
Indentures, at 99 (1936). Of 3o8 corporate trustees, the commission found 240 were also commercial bankers.
253 Stat. 1149 (1939), i5 U.S.C.A. § 77aaa (Supp. 1939).

3The commission will refuse to allow a registration statement for the sale of indenture securities to become effective if the indenture does not contain the provisions required by Sections 310 to 318 inclusive, § 3 o5(b)(2). Section references are to the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, which is title III of the Securities Act of 1933.
4 §§ 311, 313(a)(2),

(s),

313(b)(2). A "default," except where the trustee acts as trustee for

two or more qualified indentures, is defined as "any failure to make payment in full of principal
or interest, when and as the same becomes due and payable" by the terms of the indenture,

§311(a).

